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Abstract​: This article develops a framework for addressing racial ontologies in transnational            
perspective. In contrast to simple contextualist accounts, it is argued that a globally engaged              
metaphysics of race needs to address transnational continuities of racial ontologies. In            
contrast to unificationist accounts that aim for one globally unified ontology, it is argued that               
questions about the nature and reality of race do not always have the same answers across                
national contexts. In order address racial ontologies in global perspective, the article            
develops a framework that accounts for both continuities and discontinuities by looking            
beyond the referents of narrowly defined core concepts. By shifting the focus from narrow              
concepts to richer conceptions of race, racial ontologies become comparable through           
globally related but nonetheless distinct mappings between conceptions and property          
relations. The article concludes by showing how this framework can generate novel insights             
in case studies from Asia, Europe, and Latin America.  
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
W.E.B. Du Bois’ 1952 lecture “The Negro and the Warsaw Ghetto” develops an             
autobiographical perspective on the challenges of thinking about race across          
borders. Reflecting on his time at the University of Berlin in 1893-1894, Du Bois              
remarks that “race problems at the time were to me purely problems of color, and               
principally slavery in the United States and near slavery in Africa” (1971, 250). And              
indeed, this focus is clearly reflected in Du Bois’ most influential works including his              
famous claim that “the problem of the twentieth century is the problem of the              
color-line” (2007, xiv). In his address to the ​Jewish Life ​Tribute to the Warsaw Ghetto               
Fighters​, however, Du Bois reflects on his encounter with a broader “race problem             
[that] cut across lines of color and physique [...] and was a matter of cultural patterns,                
perverted teaching and human hate and prejudice, which reached all sorts of people”             
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 (1971, 253). Rather than addressing race exclusively in terms of the color line, Du              
Bois therefore embraces a global perspective that moves engagement with race           
beyond “social provincialism into a broader conception” (1970, 253). 
Du Bois’ case for a transnationally informed ”broader conception” and against           
“social provincialism” constitutes an important challenge for current debates about          
the metaphysics of race that tend to be limited to the United States with little concern                
for racial concepts and processes on a global scale (Atkin 2017). In this sense,              
Spencer (2014a, 41) is largely correct when he defines the “philosophical race            
debate” as an American affair that is concerned with “the nature and reality of race               
as understood by current ordinary folk ​in the U.S ​.” (emphasis added).  
The aim of this article is to develop a framework for expanding the scope of               
metaphysics of race and engagement with racial ontologies on a global scale.            
Section 2 introduces contextualism as a common background assumption in the           
current metaphysics of race. Assuming that different contexts require different          
ontologies of race, one may conclude that the project of a globally oriented             
metaphysics of race is either uninformative or incoherent. While the transnational           
heterogeneity of processes of racialization indeed requires some kind of          
contextualism, it is argued that a simple contextualism misses how many of these             
processes extend across (cultural, linguistic, geographic, social, and political)         
borders. Section 3 argues that the alternative to contextualism is not a unificationism             
that downplays transnational variation in the pursuit of one globally unified ontology            
of race. The insights and shortcomings of both contextualism and unificationism           
provide the foundation for an alternative and relational framework that addresses           
ontologies of race in terms of globally related but nonetheless distinct mappings            
between conceptions and property relations, While section 4 outlines a general           1
strategy for approaching racial ontologies as globally related but not identical,           
section 5 illustrates the benefits of this strategy through three case studies from Asia,              
Europe, and Latin America.  
1 Addressing ontologies of race through conceptions and property relations is not supposed to              
presuppose racial realism. For example, the framework builds on an analysis of race conceptions that               
often involve false racialist assumptions and therefore do not fully map onto existing property              
relations. Furthermore, I use the example of post-Holocaust Germany to argue that at least some               
racial ontologies emphasize these racialist dimensions so strongly that realist interpretations become            
implausible. 
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2 Contextualism and its Limitations 
 
While metaphysics of race is concerned with the nature and reality of race, much of               
the current literature is (implicitly or explicitly) restricted to the nature and reality of              
race in the United States. This restriction is not unique to a specific metaphysical              
position but widely shared by otherwise incompatible accounts from anti-realism to           
biological realism.  
For example, anti-realists about race often employ “mismatch arguments” to          
show that talk about real biological or social groups is not talk “about race, at least                
not in the relevant, ordinary, folk sense of the term” (Glasgow 2010, 55). Glasgow              
defends this claim by providing detailed evidence of “relatively non-negotiable          
conceptual commitments [...] that prevent us from understanding race” as real           
biological or social groups. My aim here is not to evaluate Glasgow’s evidence but              
only to point out that he does not (and does not claim to) provide evidence for these                 
conceptual commitments in countries such as China, Italy, Libya, Myanmar, Peru,           
Russia, or Zimbabwe. Instead, Glasgow’s appeal to “our language use and and            
practices“ is best interpreted as limiting his claims to a much more restricted context              
of the United States (and potentially some additional Anglophone countries). 
Appeals to American language use are not limited to anti-realism but also an             
important component of arguments for competing positions such as biological          
realism ​about race. For example, Spencer’s two-step argument for biological realism           
combines empirical claims about human population structure with conceptual claims          
about the “US meaning of ‘race’” (2014b, 1027). First, Spencer argues that            
contemporary population genetics identifies continental clusters that form what he          
calls the “Blumenbach partition”. Second, he argues that the Blumenbach partition is            
also identified by United States Census racial categories and should be considered            
the referent of ​race. Spencer could therefore be hardly more explicit about the             
limitation of his biological realism to what he calls the “national meaning of ‘race’ in               
the United States” (2014b, 1026).  
 
2.1 Contextualizing Ontologies 
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One may be tempted to treat the US-centrism of current metaphysical debates as a              
reductio by pointing out that the nature and reality of race is not exclusively an               
American affair. However, it would be a mistake to assume that philosophers of race              
are not aware of contextual variation beyond the United States. Instead,           
metaphysical restrictions to the United States tend to be justified through the            
meta-metaphysical assumption that “race does not travel” (Root 2000, 631) and that            
there is no transnationally valid ontology of race. According to such a contextualism,             
accounts of the nature and reality of race have to be restricted to specific national               
contexts. American philosophers of race are therefore perfectly justified to limit their            
arguments to the US ontology of race just as Indonesian or Sudanese philosophers             
could limit their arguments to Indonesian or Sudanese ontologies of race.   2
One can make contextualist background assumptions more explicit by         
following Glasgow’s (2011) suggestion of adding indices to concepts of race.           
Glasgow proposes this strategy to clarify that he is concerned with the folk concept              
of race rather than a more specialized (e.g. biomedical) concept of race. Just as this               
can be clarified by talking about ​race​folk and ​race​biomedical​, one may also clarify             
temporal and geographical contextuality by adding further indices. In this sense,           
much of the ontological debate should be understood as being concerned with the             
referent of ​race ​folk-contemporary-US​. Furthermore, metaphysicians of race do not have to           
worry about their analyses being inadequate for ​race​folk-1894-France​,        
race ​biomedical-contemporary-Israel​, or even ​race​folk-2003-Darfur because they never claimed to say          
anything about these contexts.  
 
2.2 Problems with Simple Contextualism 
 
2 There is a political problem with this line of argument that I am not going to explore further but that is                      
illustrated by the lack of extensive debates about Indonesian or Sudanese (or really any              
non-Anglophone) ontologies of race in major philosophy journals: A simple contextualist division of             
labor generates epistemic injustices that mirror current hierarchies between global centres and            
peripheries of academic philosophy. In this sense, the emergence of analytic metaphysics of race              
may have contributed to a better understanding of racialization in the United States but has certainly                
not made substantial contributions to understanding racialization in global contexts such as Sudan             
(e.g. in the genocide in Darfur) to Indonesia (e.g. in the independence of Timor-Leste).  
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 While the global variation of racialized practices makes some form of contextualism            
necessary, contextualism alone is not sufficient for addressing racial ontologies on a            
global scale. Let us define ​simple contextualism as a position that reduces the             
metaphysics of race to debates about contextualized entities such as          
race ​folk-contemporary-US​. According to such a simple contextualism, there is no interesting           
debate about racial ontology beyond specific contexts because race does “not travel”            
between them. 
This simple contextualist compartmentalization is inadequate because it fails         
to address the global nature of many racialization processes. For example, Root            
(2000, 631) is right to point out that a black man in the United States may not be                  
counted as black in Brazil (see Muniz and Bastos 2017) but this does not mean that                
there are no meaningful continuities between these countries. Most obviously,          
racialization processes in Brazil and the United States are both the product of             
European settler colonialism and the transatlantic slave trade. Understanding these          
processes requires engagement with their transnational nature. Of course, there are           
also many meaningful differences in how racialization works in Brazil and the United             
States from affirmative action (Oliven 2007) to medical sciences (Chor and Lima            
2005). However, a discussion that only considers contextual variation without          
acknowledging the existence of global racialization processes will provide an          
incomplete metaphysical picture and at best a partial answer to the ontological            
question of what there is. At the very least, contextualized debates about localized             
processes that “do not travel” have to be supplemented with a globally informed             
debate that investigates how racialization processes “do travel” across cultural,          
linguistic, social, and political borders.  
While analytic metaphysics of race has largely neglected issues of          
transnational continuity, the global character of racialization has been at the centre of             
other engagements with race in anti-colonial, black nationalist, and “Third World”           
Marxist traditions. One widely shared assumption in these traditions is that           
racialization is at its core a global process because it is grounded in an equally               
global system of colonization and white supremacy. Cruse’s 1962 essay          
“Revolutionary Nationalism and the Afro-American” illustrates this line of argument          
by insisting that race in the United States is still colonial in nature: “From the               
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 beginning, the American Negro has existed as a colonial being. His enslavement            
coincided with the colonial expansion of European powers and was nothing more or             
less than a condition of domestic colonialism. Instead of the United States            
establishing a colonial empire in Africa, it brought the colonial system home and             
installed it in the Southern states” (2009, 76). This idea of a “black colony” did not                
only allow Cruse to conceive race in the United States as a national expression of a                
global phenomenon but also became widely adopted by black nationalist movements           
of the 1960s including the Black Panther Party (e.g. 10 Point Program, §10) and the               
Revolutionary Action Movement (e.g. 12-Point Program, §9), which used the idea of            
racialization as colonization as the foundation of radical anti-colonial and          
internationalist politics.  
While these anti-colonial and internationalist framings of race from the 1960s           
have lost much influence in racial discourse, critical race theory often continues to             
address race as a global phenomenon that is grounded in an equally global system              
of white supremacy. For example, Winant’s ​The World is a Ghetto ​(2001) provides a              
helpful reconsideration of a “world racial system” at the beginning of the 21st             
century. Winant starts with an analysis of what he describes as “the break” in the “old                
world racial system” after World War II through global movements that challenged            
colonialism and explicit systems of white supremacy from apartheid in South Africa            
to Jim Crow in the United States. Winant stresses that these movements have been              
successful in forcing a "worldwide rupture of the racial status quo" (2001, 1) and that               
the “world underwent a profound shift in the global logic of race, a crisis of world                
racial formation” (2004, 15).  
However, Winant also insists that this rupture has led to a transformation            
rather than disappearance of the “world racial system”. Following Gramsci’s ([​1926]           
2014) distinction between direct domination and cultural hegemony, Winant         
characterizes the world racial system as shifting from dominant to hegemonic “white            
supremacy [that] has proven itself capable of [...] repackaging itself as ‘colorblind,’            
nonracialist, and ‘meritocratic’ (2004, xiii).” While invisibility of oppression is a core            
feature of any system of hegemony that replaces the direct violence of systems of              
domination, the hegemonic character of the current racial system still almost           
universally enforces white supremacy: “Pick any relevant sociological indicator — life           
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 expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, access to health care, income levels — and            
apply it in virtually any setting, global, regional, or local, and the results will be the                
same: the worldwide correlation of wealth and well-being with white skin and            
European descent” (2001, 35).  
While Winant could hardly be more explicit in claiming ontological significance           
of his analysis for understanding ​race ​as a “socially constructed and politically            
contested” (2004, 39) category, the global character of white supremacy is rarely at             
the centre of debates about the nature and reality of race in analytic metaphysics. An               
important exception is Mills’ version of social constructionism that addresses race as            
a reality that is created through “white supremacy as a sociopolitical system” (2003).             
Mills not only emphasizes the global character of white supremacy but also its status              
as “a theoretical object in its own right - a global social system comparable in current                
significance [...] to Marx's class society and feminist thinkers' patriarchy” (2003, 178).            
Given Mills’ framing, a simple contextualism that ignores the transnational character           
of white supremacy would be as inadequate for understanding the nature of race as              
a metaphysics of class that ignores the global character of capitalism.  
While there remains considerable room for disagreement about the exact role           
of global issues in racial ontologies​, ​the internationalist tradition in critical race theory             
indicates that a simple contextualism, which is limited to relativized ontologies such            
as ​race​folk-contemporary-US, will miss the transnational nature of many processes of           
racialization. As a result, it provides at best an incomplete framework for a globally              
engaged metaphysics of race and runs the risk of obscuring the global nature of              
racialization.  
 
3 Unificationism and its Limitations 
 
One may react to the limitations of contextualism by proposing a radically different             
strategy that aims for one globally unified ontology and provides transnational           
answers to questions about the nature and reality of race. This section presents two              
different ways of developing such a unificationism. First, one may propose           
unificationist ontologies on the basis of global “white supremacy” in the sense of the              
last section. Second, one may follow Hardimon (2017) who has argued for the global              
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 relevance of a minimalist race concept in terms of visible features that mark common              
and distinctive geographical ancestry. This section argues that both strategies invert           
the problems from the last section. While a simple contextualism fails to account for              
important transnational continuities, a simple unificationism fails to account for          
transnational variation of the nature and reality of race.  
 
3.1 Unification Through Global White Supremacy​. In developing his account of white            
supremacy as a sociopolitical system, Mills (2003, 180) emphasizes that “insofar as            
the modern world has been foundationally shaped by European colonialism, white           
supremacy could be seen as transnational, global, the historic domination of white            
Europe over non-white non-Europe”. Acknowledgment of a transnational colonial         
system of white supremacy, however, does not imply endorsement of a unificationist            
ontology that globally answers questions about the nature of race in terms of             
positioning in this system. There are at least two reasons for this. First, white              
supremacy may constitute a transnational system of racialization without constituting          
the ​only system of racialization. Second, a system of white supremacy may exist             
across contexts but still not constitute the referent of concepts of race across all of               
them. 
To illustrate the first concern, consider the intra-European history of          
racialization and especially antisemitism. Indeed, there remains considerable        
disagreement about the question at what historical stage Jews became a racialized            
group with some authors including medieval forms of antisemitism while others           
locate racialization more firmly in modernity (see Bessone 2013; Doron 2016; Heng            
2013). Even if the racialization of Jews does not the predate colonial projects of              
white supremacy, however, it would still be historically inaccurate to consider the            
process reducible to white supremacy of modern European colonialism. For          
example, Germany’s colonial aspirations in the 19th century certainly interacted with           
German antisemitism but it would be inaccurate to think of the latter being reducible              
to the former (Geulen 2004; Hund 2017). Understanding racial ontologies in           
19th-century Germany only in terms of a colonial system of white supremacy would             
misunderstand a system that racialized Jews with distinct methods (e.g. targeting an            
“invisible enemy” of assimilated Jews without phenotypic characteristics such as          
8 
 visible whiteness) and goals (e.g. establishment of distinctly Germanic supremacy          
over Jewish and Slavic people). In other words: Race may often be grounded in              
colonial project of white supremacy but at least occasionally also in other systems of              
racialization.  
The possibility of multiple systems of racialization can also be motivated with            
controversies about the boundaries of race on a global scale. While there remains             
considerable disagreement about the scope of racial phenomena in global          
perspective (see section 5.3), much of the recent literature has been critical of             
diffusionist models that address global racialization as a simple export from a            
European centre to its non-European peripheries. Diffusionist models have not only           
been criticized as reflecting a “Eurocentric interpretation of a Eurocentric ideology”           
(Berg and Wendt 2011, 2) but also become contrasted with alternative “interactionist”            
models that postulate multiple interacting systems of racialization (Bonnett 2017).          
Dikötter’s work on the emergence of racial discourses in modern China ([1998] 2015)             
has been groundbreaking in this regard as it reconstructs the formation of racialized             
practices in China as the result of an interaction between European ideologies and             
distinctly Chinese concerns from the justification of Manchu rule to post-revolutionary           
nation-building. A global unification of racial ontologies in terms of white supremacy            
runs the risk of ignoring how these interactions have led to genuinely novel systems              
of racialization. For example, consider the case of anti-black violence in China from             
attacks against African students in the 1980s (Cheng 2011) to more recent            
repression of the African community in Guangzhou (Federl 2014). Thinking of race            
exclusively in terms of white supremacy runs the risk of failing to recognize such              
cases as racial because of their embedding in a distinctly Chinese system of             
racialization.  
In addition to this multiplicity of systems of racialization, the multiplicity of            
concepts of race provides a further reason for skepticism about global unification.            
Even if a system of white supremacy exists across contexts, it may not always be the                
referent of local race concepts. For example, consider divergent developments of           
racial discourses in Germany and the United States after World War II. Even it is true                
that ​race in the United States is best understood as referring to a social kind that is                 
the product of white supremacy, the same may not be true in post-Holocaust             
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 Germany where race is so strongly associated with debunked racialist Nazi ideology            
that claims about the social character and reality of race appear self-contradictory. 
To illustrate this conceptual divergence, consider a policy paper of the           
Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte ​(German Institute for Human Rights) on          
article 3 of German basic law that states that “no person shall be favoured or               
disfavoured because of [...] race” (Deutscher Bundestag 1949). The policy paper           
appeals to the German consensus about the non-existence of races in arguing for             
the elimination of this passage: “There seems to be awareness of the problems of              
the concept ‘race’ in Germany as well as a will to not use the concept anymore. Now                 
is the time for the last step: the concept of race should not be used anymore in legal                  
texts” (Cremer 2010, 6, translation by author). Note that the paper does not deny the               
existence of white supremacy in Germany and is actually motivated by the goal of              
improving anti-racist practices. However, it insists that the German concept of race            
refers to racialist illusions rather than social realities.  
Recent debates about ​Weisssein ​(“whiteness”) in Germany provide further         
evidence that recognition of social realities of white supremacy does not presuppose            
an account of race in terms of these realities. For example, Amjahid’s (2017) book              
Unter Weissen (“Among Whites”) dissects German practices of white supremacy but           
explicitly avoids realist appeals to ​Rasse ​by pointing out the “historical burden”            
(2017, 49) of the concept. In this sense, the German concept of race may indeed be                
more adequately understood in analogy to other failed concepts such as ​witch​. While             
alleged witches were forced in very real social positions, claims about the reality of              
races in Germany seem just as misleading as claims about the reality of witches. A               3
comparison of racial discourses in United States and Germany therefore illustrates a            
second challenge for the unification of racial ontologies: even if a sociopolitical            
system such as white supremacy extends transnationally, it may not always           
constitute the referent of local race concepts.  
3 Even if it is true that the current German concept of race refers to false ideas in continuity of Nazi                     
racialism, one may still wonder whether Germans ​should introduce a notion of race that identifies               
social realities. Although there is hardly a debate about this normative question of conceptual              
engineering (see footnote 6) in Germany, it has been occasionally endorsed by German academics              
who are influenced by American race discourses (Arndt 2005; Barskanmaz 2011). Analogous issues             
of negative effects of European colorblindness through elimination of racial discourses have been             
raised in other countries including France (Balibar 1992; Bessone 2013; Simon 2008) and the              
Netherlands (Schaap 2014; Wekker 2016).  
10 
  
3.2 Unification Through a Minimalist Concept of Race. ​While white supremacy forms            
the basis for one potential strategy of global unification, Hardimon (2017, 31) has             
recently proposed a very different unificationism and argued that “race is now a             
world concept par excellence. It is clear that there are different conceptions of race.              
But it is plausible to assume that these different conceptions of race are articulations              
of one and the same concept”. According to Hardimon, this global concept of race              
can be specified in terms of a “logical core” of three minimal biological requirements              
of (a) patterns of visible features, (b) common ancestry, (c) distinctive geographical            
ancestry.  4
Unfortunately, Hardimon simply suggests the global applicability of his “logical          
core” without providing empirical evidence. In addition to this lack of positive            
evidence, the problems from 3.1 extend to Hardimon’s brand of unificationism. First,            
a multiplicity of systems of racialization plausibly leads to a multiplicity of race             
concepts. For example, consider Hardimon’s element (a) and his insistence on the            
necessity of actual patterns of visible features (2017, 34). Even if we accept that              
visible phenotypic variation applies to racialized groups in the United States, it does             
not apply to Jews as the major racialized group in much of European history. This               
may be an acceptable consequence for ​race​folk-contemporary-US but raises doubts about           
the three elements (a) - (c) as a basis for a globally extended “world concept” of                
race.  
Second, transnational conceptual variation provides more direct evidence for         
the inadequacy of Hardimon’s logical core in global perspective. For example,           
Hardimon contrasts his core in the sense of (a) - (c) with racialist concepts of race                
that assume biological essences or normatively important differences. He argues          
that the ordinary concept of race is not racialist because “there is no contradiction in               
saying that Caucasians are a race but have no biological essences or that             
4 Note that Hardimon’s unificationism can be seen as limited by his case for a concept of socialrace                  
that identifies hierarchical social positions rather than the three minimal features (a) - (c). While               
Hardimon therefore acknowledges the need for several concepts of human diversity, he is also very               
explicit in arguing that “SOCIALRACE is not a race concept” and that “the logical core in a committal                  
way counts as a race concept proper​” (2014, 76, emphasis in original). With regard to the “race                 
concept proper”, Hardimon’s proposal therefore suggests a unificationist perspective.  
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 Sub-Saharan Africans are a race even though there is no normatively important            
feature common and peculiar to them” (2017, 29). As the earlier discussion of racial              
discourses in post-Holocaust Germany illustrates, there are reasons to assume that           
saying these things is actually contradictory in Germany because the dominant           
concept of race in Germany is not Hardimon’s minimalist concept. As Plümecke            
(2013, 12) summarizes racial discourses in Germany: “‘Rasse’ is the unword of the             
last 60 years, semantically entangled with the purity and destruction-oriented          
eugenic policy of the Nazis. Not even racist pamphlets [...] are allowed to contain this               
word” (translation by author).  
Even more straightforward evidence for the inadequacy of Hardimon’s “world          
concept” hypothesis can be found in German reception of American race discourses            
such as recent controversies about Reich’s (2018) article “How Genetics Is           
Changing Our Understanding of ‘Race’“ in the ​New York Times ​. An editorial of             
leading German researchers in the ​Süddeutsche Zeitung swiftly reacted to German           
reception of this controversy with a warning that “one should not confuse the             
American term ‘race’ with the German word ‘Rasse’” (Lipphardt et al. 2018,            
translation by author). The authors doubt that “‘race’ means what German refers to             
as ‘Rasse’” and point out that race-talk in the United States is far more normalized               
than in Germany: “Many people in the US are accustomed to using ‘race’ or              
‘ethnicity’ to express their self-positioning in a community” (Lipphardt et al. 2018,            
translation by author). While this normalization makes Hardimon’s assumption of a           
restricted logical core appealing in the American context, the continued dominance           
of racialist associations with “Rasse” makes the same analysis implausible in           
Germany.  
 
To sum up, unificationist perspectives on global racial ontologies face at least two             
problems. First, there is the problem of multiple material systems of racialization.            
Even if white supremacy or Hardimon’s three minimal conditions apply          
transnationally in many contexts, it is doubtful that they apply in all contexts to all               
racialized groups. For example, it is not obvious how either of these proposals would              
analyze the case of antisemitism in Europe. Second, there is the problem of multiple              
diverging racial discourses that have led to the development of different race            
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 concepts. Even if structures such as white supremacy or Hardimon’s three           
conditions are stable across contexts, it may turn out that they do not constitute the               
referent of all local race concepts. 
 
4 A Framework for Relating Racial Ontologies  
 
While there are limitations to unificationist and contextualist accounts of racial           
ontologies, both perspectives also convey important insights. The challenge for a           
globally engaged metaphysics of race is to develop a framework that can integrate             
insights about transnational convergences and divergences. This section proposes a          
methodological reorientation in debates about racial ontologies that leads to a           
relational perspective and contrasts with simple contextualist and unificationist         
models. The following section discusses three case studies that show how this            
framework can generate novel insights in transnational perspective. 
The basic methodological suggestion of this section is to reorient global           
debates about racial ontologies from a narrow focus on race concepts to a wider              
focus on race conceptions. The distinction between concepts and conceptions has           
been prominently used in Rawls’ (1971) discussion of a widely shared concept of             
justice (roughly: ​equal rights and duties​) and his preferred conception (​justice as            
fairness​). More recently, Hardimon has employed this distinction to propose a           
metaphysics of race that focuses on “the logical core” of “the ordinary race concept              
stripped down to the barest bones” (2017, 28). By approaching metaphysical           
questions about the nature and reality of race in terms of such a narrowly understood               
concept of race, Hardimon can defend an ontology of race in terms of his three               
“minimal conditions” (see section 3.2) without having to deny that a richer conception             
of race involves many other aspects from social hierarchies to false essentialist            
assumptions.  
This restriction to a narrowly conceived core of the concept of race is not              
unique to Hardimon’s proposal but widely shared in current metaphysics of race. For             
example, anti-realists typically do not deny that there are real biological and social             
differences associated with race but insist that false (e.g. essentialist and/or racialist)            
assumptions are at the non-negotiable core of the concept of race (Glasgow 2010).             
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 Furthermore, social constructionists do not deny that race is associated with           
biological differences or false assumptions but insist that race “in the core sense, is              
defined in terms of social relations” (Haslanger 2012, 185). It is therefore not             
surprising that much of the metaphysics of race has focused on the priority of (e.g.               
biological, cultural, social, racialist) features at the core of ​race​.  
A debate about racial ontologies in terms of a conceptual core “stripped down             
to the barest bones” comes with the virtue of simplicity as competing accounts             
characterize the nature of race in terms of one core property (e.g. being posited in a                
system of white supremacy) or a small set of core properties (e.g. Hardimon’s three              
minimal conditions). In the context of an analysis of global ontologies of race,             
however, this virtue can turn into a vice by fostering misrepresentations of complex             
relations: if one keeps the logical core stable across global contexts, one runs the              
risk of obscuring transnational heterogeneity of racial ontologies. If one claims that            
different contexts involve different cores, one runs the risk of obscuring transnational            
continuities of racial ontologies. 
Focusing on conceptions rather than concepts increases the complexity of          
analysis along three dimensions of (1) heterogenous conceptual connections, (2)          
material property relations, and (3) mappings between them. To illustrate these           
dimensions, consider two biological properties B1 and B2 such as South Asian            
ancestry and the sickle cell allele, two cultural properties C1 and C2 such as being               
Muslim or having a preference for Jazz music, two social properties S1 and S2 such               
as access to higher education and employment opportunities, and two properties D1            
and D2 with debunked racialist associations such as innate tendency towards           
criminality and cognitive profiles. Focusing on conceptions rather than concepts of           
race allows an analysis of how these properties are conceptually and materially            
related across national contexts. Figure 1 provides two hypothetical contexts by           
representing the strengths of conceptual connections through the strength of          
connecting lines.  
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Figure 1​: Representation of two conceptions of race in two distinct contexts. Some associations (B1               
and B2) remain relatively stable across contexts while others (C1 and C2) are unique to a specific                 
context. Furthermore, the strength of  associations (e.g. S1 and D1) can vary.  
 
Starting with the conceptual dimension, an analysis of figure 1 in terms of logical              
cores would suggest that contexts A and B employ very different race concepts:             
connections with social properties such as S1 and S2 are dominant in context A              
while debunked racialist associations with D1 and D2 are dominant in context B. In              
contrast with such a limited conclusion that only recognizes different cores, a shift             
towards conceptions allows a fine-grained analysis of conceptual connections. On          
the basis of such an analysis, it becomes possible to identify subtle similarities and              
differences along the following lines: 
 
1. Strong Discontinuities​: Some conceptual connections may be significant in         
one context but (nearly) non-existent in another context. In figure 1, being            
Muslim (C1) is associated with ​race ​in context B but not in context A. For               
example, being Muslim is at least moderately associated with ​race in most            
European and North American contexts. In many Middle Eastern countries,          
however, being Muslim cross-cuts major racial categories. In Saudi Arabia, for           
example, Muslim immigrants from countries such as Bangladesh, Indonesia,         
Pakistan, Philippines, Sudan and Somalia have become part of a racially           
diverse society but the majority in each large racialized group (e.g. ​Arab,            
Black African, South Asian,​ and ​South East Asian​) is Muslim.  
2. Partial (Dis)Continuities ​: Conceptual connections may persist across contexts        
but vary significantly in strength. In the hypothetical scenario of figure 1, social             
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 and debunked racialist properties are associated with race in both contexts           
but social properties S1 and S2 are dominant in context A while debunked             
racialist assumptions D1’ and D2’ are dominant in context B. This scenario of             
partial (dis)continuities is common in racialized contexts that are shaped by           
the same transnational racialization processes but also adapted to distinct          
national contexts. For example, the social positioning of the black diaspora           
across the Americas involves many continuities through shared histories of          
colonialism and white supremacy but also discontinuities through national         
adaptations in countries as different as Canada and Suriname. 
3. Strong Continuities: ​There will be also cases where conceptual connections          
remain (largely) stable across contexts. In the hypothetical scenario of figure           
1, the association of race with biological properties B1 and B2 is largely             
comparable across contexts A and B. (Largely) identical associations can be           
the product of different processes. First, two contexts may share many           
associations due to general discourse proximity. For example, Austria and          
Germany resemble each other in associations of ​race ​with Nazi ideology but            
also share substantial parts of their racial discourses to due cultural,           
geographic, and linguistic proximity. Second, strong continuities can also be          
the product of structurally similar responses. For example, consider that not           
only Austrian and German but also Israeli public discourse tends to prefer            
eliminativist interpretations of ​race (Gissis 2008) due to structurally similar          
reflections on role of racial ideology in the Holocaust. Furthermore, consider           
appeals to black culture in black nationalism in the United States and in black              
consciousness in South Africa. In both cases, culturalist interpretations of ​race           
can be seen as structurally similar responses to cultural devaluation in           
dominant systems of white supremacy from Jim Crow to apartheid.  
 
Choosing conceptions rather than concepts as a starting point therefore provides           
opportunities for fine-grained analyses of the strength of conceptual relations and           
their comparison across national contexts. In contrast, an analysis of narrow           5
5 A fully developed account would have to say more about the measurement and operationalization of                
the strength of conceptual connections. This article does not commit to one specification, as many of                
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 concepts always runs the risk of obscuring either similarities (by proposing different            
conceptual cores) or differences (by proposing the same conceptual cores) across           
contexts.  
In addition to such an analysis of heterogeneous conceptual connections, a           
shift towards conceptions also broadens the scope of relevant material property           
relations: For each of the properties from figure 1, one cannot only ask about              
conceptual but also material connections. Figure 2 illustrates this material aspect           
with the property of South Asian ancestry (B1). At least for present purposes, it will               
be sufficient to think of material property relations in terms of relative probabilities in              
a given context. Relative to context A, for example, having South Asian ancestry             
substantially increases the probability of being Muslim (C1), while moderately          
increasing the probability of having a sickle cell allele (B2), and not affecting the              
probability of innate cognitive profiles (D2).  
 
 
 
 
the details will depend on wider philosophical commitments on issues such as semantic externalism.              
For an internalist, it may be attractive to measure the strength of connections directly through               
experimental evidence of psychological associations or even questionnaires with a representative           
sample of informants for the given context. However, externalists may appeal to experts or more               
social science-oriented methods such as discourse analysis in determining how strongly features are             
associated with ​race​. As the general case for an internationally engaged metaphysics of race should               
be acceptable for philosophers with different positions on these wider philosophical issues, I will not               
commit to one specific operationalization.  
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 Figure 2​: Properties are not only conceptually related to ​race ​(solid lines) but also materially related                
with each other (dotted lines). In this example, the dotted lines represent the material relations of the                 
property B1 (South Asian ancestry). In context A, some relations (e.g. South Asian ancestry to               
educational access) are strong, some relations (e.g. South Asian ancestry to Muslim) are moderate,              
and some relations (e.g. South Asian ancestry to cognitive profiles) are non-existent.  
  
Just as one can compare conceptual connections across national contexts,          
transnational comparisons are also possible between material property relations.         
Figure 3 further expands the example of B1 across two contexts and uses arrows              
and crosses to indicate an increase and decrease of relative probability. Contexts A             
and B therefore involve strong contrasts: Having South Asian ancestry (B1)           
increases the probability of being Muslim (C1) and having access higher education            
(S1) in context A while decreasing probabilities for C1 and S1 in context B.  
Such contrasts are common in global comparison. For example, consider          
South Asian communities in Canada and Saudi Arabia. In Canada, B1 is positively             
related to C1 and S1 as a majority of Canadian Muslims have South Asian ancestry               
and tend to be better educated than other Canadian populations. In contrast, people             
with South Asian ancestry constitute the largest non-Muslim population in Saudi           
Arabia and are largely recent immigrants with limited access to higher education.            
While such cases of strong variability are common in global contexts, one will also              
commonly find transnational similarities. For example, B1 will not be (positively or            
negatively) predictive of innate cognitive profiles in Canada or Saudi Arabia.  
 
 
Figure 3​: Arrows indicate positive relations between properties while crosses indicate negative            
relations. For example, the relation [B1 → C1] is positive in context A but negative in context B. 
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Finally, analyses of conceptual connections and material property relations can be           
mapped onto each other to reveal both matching and mismatching patterns. In many             
cases, the continued impact of racialist ideologies will lead to mismatches such as             
associations with behavioral and cognitive differences that simply do not exist. In            
other cases, conceptual connections will match social realities such as racialized           
income differences. While most race conceptions involve both matches and          
mismatches, there can be considerable transnational variation in the way how           
conceptual connections map onto material relations. For example, the arguments          
from the last section suggest that German conceptions of race strongly emphasize            
mismatches through essentialist and racialist associations while recent        
developments of US discourses of race have led to stronger emphasis of            
socioeconomic realities in conceptions of race (Lipphardt et al. 2018). 
To sum up, a shift from concepts to conceptions allows a more fine-grained             
comparison of transnational continuities and discontinuities of (1) heterogenous         
conceptual connections, (2) material property relations, and (3) mappings between          
them. Although such a framework provides opportunities for more fine-grained          
transnational comparison, it also shifts away from some highly visible issues in            
current metaphysics of race. Many recent metaphysical debates have focused on           
whether races exist at all and whether they have a biological or social nature.              
Approaching these questions through concepts allows the formulation of clear          
metaphysical alternatives such as anti-realism, biological realism, and social         
constructionism that appeal to competing hypotheses about the core of race           
concepts.  
In contrast, a shift towards conceptions leads to more ambiguous and           
complex accounts that may not clearly favor one specific account of the nature and              
reality of race. Race conceptions will typically involve heterogenous associations that           
partly match (biological, cultural, and social) realities and partly fail to identify real             
property relations. Race conceptions as represented in figure 1 do therefore not            
provide straightforward answers to questions about the referent of ​race​. In this            
sense, shifting the focus from concepts to conceptions does not lead to traditional             
metaphysical positions from anti-realism to biological realism but complements         
19 
 deflationist perspectives as expressed in my earlier critique of the “new metaphysics            
of race” (Ludwig 2015, 2014) that was based on the assumption that ​race “is too               
ambiguous and vague to support a general metaphysical debate about the question            
whether human races exist” (2015, 258). 
Of course, the proposed framework does not require such a general           
deflationism about traditional metaphysical projects as one could also combine the           
proposed account of conceptions with debates about the concept of race ​and its             
referent. While such a combination avoids some of the problems of an exclusive             
focus on race concepts, there are also reasons to circumvent the issue of conceptual              
cores in a globally oriented metaphysics of race. As the case studies of the next               
section will argue in further detail, attempts to isolate a conceptual core can mislead              
transnational comparisons by either overemphasizing similarities (by postulating the         
same core) or differences (by postulating different cores) between racial ontologies.           
At least for the purposes of a globally engaged metaphysics of race, it therefore              
often seems more adequate to move away from race concepts and to focus on              
conceptions that provide more complex but admittedly also more ambiguous          
answers to questions about the nature and reality of race.  6
Indeed, one may ask whether a framework that circumvents clear answers           
about the reality and nature of race should still be called “metaphysics” as it seems               
to be closer to deflationist criticism of the current state of metaphysics (Gannett             
2010; Lemeire 2017; Ludwig 2015; Mallon 2006; McPherson 2015). An answer to            
this question largely depends on how broad “metaphysics” is conceived and whether            
straightforward answers to questions about the existence and nature of races are            
seen as a prerequisite of proper metaphysics of race (Hochman 2016). Although            
these questions about the boundaries of “metaphysics of race” are interesting in their             
own right, they are not essential for the goal of developing a framework of              
transnational comparison. Given this goal, the designation of the proposed          
framework as “metaphysical” is not crucial as long as it provides resources for a              
6 Note that this still leaves room for a more normative debate about the core of race concepts in the                    
sense of current accounts of amelioration (Haslanger 2012) and conceptual engineering (Cappelen            
2018). Even if ​race involves many heterogenous conceptual connections that undermine identification            
of one clear core, it can still be important to discuss which of these dimensions ​should be emphasized                  
in public and/or scientific discourse. 
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 fine-grained analysis of race conceptions and their mapping onto material property           
relations.  
 
5 The Relational Framework in Practice 
 
The last section introduced a relational perspective on racial ontologies that builds            
on an analysis of conceptions rather than concepts. This section specifies the            
framework and its advantages in the context of three applied challenges of a globally              
engaged metaphysics of race: (5.1) Addressing partial continuities in transnational          
perspective, (5.2) understanding the entanglement of ethnicity and race, (5.3)          
addressing global boundary disputes about race. For each of these challenges, it is             
argued that a narrow focus on concepts leads to overly simple answers while a              
discussion of conceptions allows to adequately relate racial ontologies. 
 
5.1 African-American and Afro-German: Partial Transnational Continuities. Section 3         
discussed diverging concepts of race in Germany and the United States as a             
challenge for unificationist approaches. Given diverging conceptual change in         
response to the Holocaust and the Civil Rights Movement​, it seems plausible that             
race concepts in Germany and the United States do currently not share the same              
“logical core” (Lipphardt et al. 2018). However, the claim that race concepts have             
different cores in different contexts (maybe: false racialist assumptions in Germany,           
real social properties in the United States) generates different problems as it            
suggests that races are entirely different entities (e.g. debunked illusions vs. social            
kinds) in these contexts. The challenge for a comparatively adequate metaphysics of            
race is therefore to account for partial continuities ​between contexts such as            
Germany and the United States.  
Audre Lorde’s reflections on the category “Afro-German” during her time in           
Berlin in the 1980s provide a forceful illustration of these partial continuities and their              
importance in practice. Lorde acknowledges important differences between Germany         
and the United States and that black Germans constitute a heterogeneous group            
(e.g. children of Allied army members, immigrants from West Africa to West            
Germany, and from socialist “brother states” like Mozambique to East Germany). At            
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 the same time, Lorde’s case for a new category “Afro-German” and the emergence             
of the ​Neue Schwarze Bewegung (“New Black Movement”) more generally          
(Oguntoye 1986) was inspired by the Civil Rights Movement and structural           
similarities with African-American experiences. As Lorde summarizes this complexity         
in an intersectional context: “as an African American woman [...] I must go to the               
Afro-German woman and say, 'In what way does your experience differ from mine?'             
One of the differences that is most obvious that I see is that there are so many more                  
of us in the United States of America, that as African American women we have had                
a history of recognition of each other, from slavery on, and therefore we have a pool                
to draw from. I think the Afro-German women have existed in a terrible isolation from               
each other [...]. We need to see, and we do, that our oppressor is the same with very                  
different faces”  (2004, 169-170). 
 A comparative metaphysics of race in Germany and the United States that is             
based on a narrow focus on race concepts will neglect either the similarities or              
differences depending on whether the “logical core” is assumed to be stable between             
Germany and the ​United States. In contrast, a shift towards conceptions provides            
metaphysicians of race with tools for analyzing complex real life cases of partial             
continuities in transnational perspective. Indeed, German and American discourses         
have developed in diverging directions through post-Holocaust emphasis of Nazi          
ideologies and post–Civil Rights Era emphasis of continued social stratification.          
While such divergences may have put different aspects at the core of race concepts,              
racialization processes remain (conceptually and materially) connected from the use          
of phenotypic markers to social stratification along racial lines. Addressing this           
situation through a relational framework in the sense of figure 1 and 3 puts              
philosophers in the position to contribute to a better understanding of these complex             
situations that involve substantive discontinuities (e.g. resources for black identities)          
and continuities (e.g. shared experience of oppression).  
 
5.2 Indígena and Mestizo ​: The Entanglement of Ethnicity and Race. ​The social             
positioning of Indigenous peoples across the Americas constitutes an important          
challenge for transnational comparisons of racial ontologies. In the United States,           
Indigenous peoples are commonly (e.g. in the United States Census) identified as a             
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 racial group that shares positioning as ​Native American ​while also belonging to            
otherwise different nations, tribes, and communities. Furthermore, one may be          
inclined to think that such a racialization of Indigenous peoples applies rather            
uniformly across the Americas given shared histories of European settler colonialism           
from Tierra del Fuego to Newfoundland. 
However, Latin American scholarship on the category ​indígena ​indicates         
important divergences that cast doubt on simple unificationist strategies. One crucial           
difference is the emphasis o​f mestizo as a mediating category in Latin American             
countries such as Colombia (Leal 2010), Ecuador (Clark 2007), Mexico (Ruiz 2001)            
and Peru (de la Cadena 2007a) that strongly differs from ​mixed-race ​in the United              
States. Not only does ​mestizo often constitute the largest population group but            
mestizaje ​(as the process of “race mixture”) has been historically a core element of              
Latin American nation building as famously illustrated by Vasconcelos’ (1925) ​Raza           
Cósmica ​(“Cosmic Race”) but also already articulated by 19th-century authors like           
Semper who claimed that “the New World is destined to be to be the theater of the                 
fusion and reconciliation of the races, thus inaugurating the foundations of a new             
civilization. But what civilization? A ​mestizo ​civilization [that is] destined to           
regenerate the world, through [...] ​ fraternity​“ (1861, 79, translation by author). 
Nation building through an ideology of ​mestizaje has ontological         
consequences by making ​indígena and ​mestizo at least partly about cultural and            
social assimilation. For the Ecuadorian context, for example, Clark argues that           
“mestizaje was conceived primarily as a social rather than biological process” (2007,            
151, translation by author) ​that aimed for the transformation of allegedly uncultured            
indios into cultured ​mestizos​. Wade makes a similar point for the Peruvian ​context             
when arguing that an “indigenous migrant from the highlands of Peru who becomes             
a domestic maid in Lima is on her way to becoming a mestizo woman” (2017, 39).                
For the Mexican context, Loza (2016, 33) observes that “mestizaje was presented as             
the solution to integrating indígenas, and there were a myriad of avenues to             
transform indígenas to mestizo.” Finally, ​de la Cadena emphasizes that these           
aspects of socio-cultural fluidity are not only reflected in the imperative of            
assimilation but also in Indigenous resistance: ​“Indigenous rejection of ​mestizaje is           
not rejection of mixing. It is rejection of the epistemologies of modernity that declare              
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 their opposition to tradition and deny [...] ways of being 'non-modern'” (2007b, 30,             
translation by author).  
Even if these ​socio-cultural aspects are of crucial importance in Latin           
American contexts, it would be a mistake to conceive the distinction between            
indígena and ​mestizo ​as purely cultural and free of biologization ​(Castañeda 2016).            
For example, Delgado’s detailed case study of forensic anthropology in Mexico does            
not only show how ​indígena became associated with distinct facial features but also             
“part of the biological representation of crime in Mexico and Latin America” (2014,             
126, translation by author). Wade et al.’s ​Mestizo Genomics ​provides another case            
study of the persistence of ​biologization with ambiguous relations to racialization​:           
“Our research indicates that, despite the fact that most geneticists in Latin America             
actively deny the validity of race as a biological category, genetic science might             
produce knowledge and interpretations that, while they appear nonracial to genetic           
experts, might look a lot like race to the nonexpert in genetics” (2014, 2). 
How do these elements of cultural fluidity, social subordination, and          
biologization affect the status of ​indígena ​as a racial category? Does cultural fluidity             
show that ​indígena in Latin America ​is an ethnic category while ​Native American ​in              
the United States is a racial category? Or do continued social subordination and             
forms of biologization expose ​indígena as a covert racial category? Competing           
philosophical accounts of race concepts seem to imply dramatically different          
answers in such cases of “partially racialized groups” (Blum 2002, 32). For example,             
socio-cultural transitions from indígena to ​mestizo undermine Hardimon’s minimal         
requirements of distinct visual features and geographic ancestry. ​Insofar as these           
requirements constitute the conceptual core of ​race​, ​indígena ​seems to be an ethnic             
but not a racial category. And indeed this is a familiar framing in many Latin               
American contexts. As Leal points out: “In Colombia, for example, the concept of             
'ethnicity' came to life to designate Indigenous groups but not the rest of the              
population. [...] The majority of Colombians do not have any place in ethnic             
classification” (2010, 422, translation by author). In contrast, many social          
constructionist accounts of race (e.g. Haslanger 2012) will interpret ​indígena ​as a            
paradigmatic racial category given the subjugation of Indigenous peoples on the           
basis of biological markers and assumed ancestry.  
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 The problem with such answers (no matter whether they affirm or reject the             
status of indígena ​as a racial category) is that they provide overly simple accounts of               
highly complex constellations. ​Indígenas ​in Latin America are positioned through a           
heterogenous and often inconsistent blend of biological, cultural, and social elements           
that incorporate both ethnic and racial dimensions. A metaphysics of race that            
prioritizes one of these dimensions and simply affirms/denies the status of ​indígena            
as a racial category will be of little help in understanding racialization in Latin              
America and may actually distort the much more nuanced insights of Latin American             
scholarship. Moving from concepts to conceptions provides resources for analyzing          
this complexity without simply declaring indígena either ethnic or racial. Indeed, such            
an analysis will allow to acknowledge racial continuities between Latin America and            
the United States ​such as the position of Indigenous peoples in nation states that are               
the product of European settler colonialism. At the same time, it can also             
acknowledge elements such as cultural fluidity that distinguish ​indígena ​from racial           
categories in the United States.  
 
5.3 Tibetan and Uighur: Addressing Boundary Disputes​. The status of minority           
groups in China as racial groups has become a focal point of controversies about              
global boundaries of race (Dikötter 2015; Law 2012; Wang et al. 2003). Indeed, it is               
uncontroversial that prejudice and discrimination have been common in China both           
in historical relations to border communities and current attitudes towards minorities           
such as Tibetans and Uighurs. What is controversial, however, is whether these            
groups should be conceptualized as racial (rather than “merely” ethnic) and as            
victims of racism (rather than “merely” ethnic discrimination).  
If metaphysics of race is approached through narrow core concepts, even           
slight variation at the core will lead to drastically different demarcations in these             
kinds of boundary disputes. Maybe the most telling examples are the radically            
different implications of different variants of social constructionism. Consider         
Haslanger’s influential account of race in terms of “observed or imagined bodily            
features presumed to be evidence of ancestral links to a certain geographical region”             
(2012, 236). Such a definition applies rather straightforwardly to Tibetans and           
Uighurs in China and therefore seems to identify them as racial groups. More             
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 generally, Haslanger’s account suggests a highly inclusive strategy in boundary          
disputes that affirms the existence of races in countless contexts that are historically             
and geographically independent of European modernity (Hochman 2017). In         
contrast, recall earlier discussions of race in terms of a sociopolitical system of white              
supremacy. Given such an account, Tibetans and Uighurs are not racial groups            
because their discrimination is not grounded in this particular sociopolitical system.           
More generally, this variant of social constructionism seems to imply a highly            
exclusive strategy in global boundary disputes about forms of discrimination and           
violence that are not specifically grounded in European colonial orders.  
While it is possible to defend highly inclusive or exclusive accounts in            
boundary disputes, there is a risk of metaphysicians providing simplistic answers that            
fall behind the state of “interactionist” models (Dikötter 2015; Bonnett 2017) in the             
empirical literature that aim to understand the emergence of racial orders through the             
entanglement of elements with different historical and geographical origins.         
Embracing a relational framework puts philosophers in a position to contribute to            
substantial analyses of nuanced connections rather than postulating overly simple          
demarcation criteria that decide at what point a group “really” counts as a racial              
group. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
The aims of this article have been both critical and constructive. On the one hand, I                
argued that simple contextualist and unificationist models are insufficient for          
understanding race on a global scale. On the other hand, I outlined a positive              
proposal for globally engaged metaphysics of race that shifts attention from concepts            
to conceptions. I have argued that this shift leads to a relational perspective on racial               
ontologies in terms of transnationally related but nonetheless distinct conceptions          
and their mappings onto property relations. Finally, I have sketched some benefits of             
this relational perspective for engaging with (5.1) partial continuities of racialization           
practices, (5.2) entanglements of ethnicity and race, (5.3) and global boundary           
disputes about race. These benefits also illustrate a larger opportunity for integrating            
relational accounts of the nature and reality of race with empirical research in ethnic              
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 and racial studies. It does not only allow philosophers to engage more adequately             
with complex empirical evidence but also provides social scientists with novel           
resources for analyzing and organizing this complexity.  
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